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All I have is a voice
To undo the folded lie.
WH Auden, ‘September 1, 1939’
Folding
The metaphors of history are numberless. They range from Voltaire’s ‘tableau of crimes
and misfortunes’ to de Tocqueville’s ‘gallery of pictures’, from Dionysius’s axiom that
history is ‘philosophy from examples’ to the jocular truism that it is simply ‘what you can
remember’.1 History is all these things and more besides, and the metaphors multiply
with each new theory and interpretation of Clio’s domain.
The most fashionable metaphor of recent years has the quality of also being the
simplest: history is a text—or, to further abstract the predicate, history is text. This
construction owes much to the advent of the ‘linguistic turn’, which drew attention to the
role of language in epistemology, and the function of narrative in historiography. And
whether one regards history as ‘what actually happened’, or the record of what happened,
the metaphor remains. As Hayden White says in the preface to Metahistory: ‘I treat the
historical work as what it most manifestly is: a verbal structure in the form of a narrative
prose discourse’—in other words, a text.2
As any etymologist knows, the word ‘text’ is derived from the past participle of the
Latin verb texere, to weave. Text is therefore something that is ‘woven’. It’s a persuasive
metaphor, to imagine writing in terms of the warp and weft of ideas and words, of
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narrative threads woven together to become a piece of fabric. We can see this metaphor at
work in the language of Michel de Certeau’s question, ‘What do historians fabricate when
they “make history”?’3 De Certeau answers his question by reference to place, practice, and
text; we can say simply that what historians do is ‘fabricate’ text, they make a kind of fabric.
The idea of history as fabric brings together a whole different set of tropes, not just of
weaving, but of the very materiality of fabric. Does the fabric have a nap, or a pattern? Is it
cut with the grain, or on the bias? What of its folds, its seams? All these qualities of fabric
have application in the interpretation of history, and some of these images are already
familiar in historical discourse. For example, Walter Benjamin argues in his ‘Theses on the
Philosophy of History’ that the role of the historical materialist is ‘to brush history against
the grain’—this recalls the quality of a fabric with a nap, such as velvet or corduroy, which
changes appearance and texture depending on its direction. Similarly, GR Elton devotes a
chapter of The Practice of History to the role of ‘patterns and bias’—a pattern is ruptured
when it is cut and joined, and a fabric that is cut ‘on the bias’ creates a different shape as it
falls, giving it body and movement.4
Thinking of history as fabric gives it a sense of physical materiality, as something
textured yet pliable, something that can be coloured by dye, that can be rent into shreds,
be cut and sewn, unpicked and restitched. It is also something that can be folded, to bring
together times and places that are otherwise separate and apart. Gilles Deleuze dedicates a
whole book to the philosophical significance of folding: ‘the fold affects all materials … it
becomes a form of expression’.5 Folding creates an artificial sense of relations, and a
double fold creates a new visible pattern that does not necessarily exist in the original
fabric. This is the case at a physical level, such as the way the back cover of a Mad
magazine can be folded to produce an unexpected image. But it also extends to the
metaphysical, such as when Mrs Who explains the ‘tesseract’ in A Wrinkle in Time, by
folding parts of a skirt together to shorten the distance of time and space.6
Returning then to De Certeau’s question, we can say that what is fabricated in making
history is a fold in time and space. When we make folds we bring together events, people
and places which might otherwise be unrelated, in order to make a story. And when a
historian polishes this story into a text, it is akin to ironing the folds into pleats. Pleats can
be of differing type and magnitude of course. A box pleat makes a feature of the folding
process, whereas an inverted pleat hides the folds behind a smooth surface. It’s easy to see
how these metaphors can be applied to differing interpretations of history, for example the
colonisation of Tasmania: one historian foregrounds the issue of violence, another tucks it
neatly out of sight. But each one makes folds and seams in narratives and archives; each
one pleats the fabric of history.
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Digging
In the proem to Henry Handel Richardson’s Australia Felix a miner is buried alive in a
shaft in the Gravel Pits at Ballarat:
The digger fell forward on his face, his ribs jammed across his pick, his arms pinned 
to his sides, nose and mouth pressed into the sticky mud as into a mask; and over 
his defenceless body, with a roar that burst his ear-drums, broke stupendous masses
of earth.7
This scene presents the double vision of a man at the mercy of the elemental soil and clay,
and of the defiled earth exacting revenge for its rape and exploitation by the miner. At a
structural level this passage introduces the themes of death and burial that will frame
Richardson’s trilogy The Fortunes of Richard Mahony. It also invokes what might be called
the national topos of ‘death by landscape’, an image that stalks the Australian imagination
from Leichhardt and Voss to Azaria Chamberlain, from Picnic at Hanging Rock to Death of a
River Guide.
But if we make a fold between the subject of the novel and the year of its publication in
1917, a further reading suggests itself—again surrounding the discourses of nation and
the sacrifice of the male subject, but a long way from the goldfields of colonial Ballarat.
Rereading the paragraph against the moment of its publication, Richardson’s narrative
becomes an uncanny mimesis of the trenches of the Great War. A ‘digger’ is interred in the
mud amid a roaring hail of vomiting earth. Here is a gripping and accurate description of
a soldier being hit by artillery, of being buried in the mire under Wilfred Owen’s ‘shrill,
demented choirs of wailing shells’.8 When the later, transposed meaning of the Anzac
‘digger’ is considered, the picture is complete. The striking parallels between miner and
soldier demonstrate how easily images and stories of one time and place can be applied to
another, and made to fit a pattern.
By visiting various sites of national imagery, Richardson’s novel generates some
expectation about its engagement with the ‘narrative of nation’. But as Philip Mead 
argues, The Fortunes of Richard Mahony does not simply symbolise or metaphorise the
birth of the nation; rather, the novel suggests there is no possible reconciliation between
subject and nation.9 Certainly any homology between the diggers at Eureka and the
emergent Australian democracy has miscarried in the national consciousness
(notwithstanding the momentum of the Eureka 150 celebrations). Meanwhile that
other digger, the Anzac, has become fused inseparably with national identity, and
Gallipoli has become the seam around which the history of Australian nationhood is
shaped and told.
—
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The way the stories of Australian nationhood coalesce in the signifier ‘Gallipoli’ are a
perfect example of what Gananath Obeyesekere calls a ‘myth model’. Obeyesekere defines
a myth model as a paradigmatic myth that serves as a model for mythmaking: ‘an
underlying set of ideas (or cluster of mythemes) employed in a variety of narrative
forms’.10 The motivation for this term is to show that mythopœisis is not restricted to so-
called savage thought, but is ‘equally prolific’ in modern societies. Obeyesekere introduces
this idea in the context of his debate with Marshall Sahlins about the death of Captain
Cook, and whether the Hawaiians regarded Cook as a god or a man. There are strengths
and weaknesses on both sides of this debate, but the main advantage of Obeyesekere’s
approach is that it moves the question of ‘myth’ from one of ontology and epistemology
(for example, how savages think) to one of narratology: that is, how we tell stories.
Obeyesekere suggests that a myth model is the form of a myth articulated in narrative
genres according to the ideologies and technologies apposite to the society at the time. As
historical conditions change, the form of the myth model is modulated through prevailing
genres, though the narratives remain ‘isomorphic’ with previous manifestations. It is easy
to see how mythemes can be inserted or ‘embroidered’ into narratives, and thus how myth
models can flourish in forms such as fiction, biography and history. And as I will discuss
below, the example of Gallipoli demonstrates the particular affinity of myth models to the
narratives of nationhood.
Dying
Most recent theorists writing on the subject ‘nations, nationhood and nationalism’ concur
that the contemporary nation is a relatively modern phenomenon, which gained
momentum in the nineteenth century and blossomed fully in the twentieth. In 1882
Ernest Renan can say with confidence that ‘Nations are a new feature in history’. A
century later and little has changed. Eric Hobsbawm still writes on the nation as a
‘novelty’, Tom Nairn declares nationalism to be the ‘pathology of modern developmental
history’, and Benedict Anderson sees the idea of the nation as quintessentially
contemporary: ‘Nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of
our time’.11
The end of the Great War affords some of the clearest examples of this outpouring of
‘nation-ness’ and national identity. Apart from the issue of reparations, the Treaty of
Versailles is characterised particularly by the political foundation and re-formation of
numerous states (many of which already considered themselves ‘nations’). Says
Hobsbawm, ‘If there was a moment when the nineteenth-century “principle of
nationality” triumphed it was at the end of World War I’.12 The correlative for Anzac and
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nationhood in Australia is that the historical event of Gallipoli is coeval with a unique and
particular moment in the international development of the concept of the nation. This is
crucial in understanding what sort of myth models were active in the national imagination
in the decades surrounding Federation and Gallipoli.
There have been many hypotheses on the whys and wherefores of the rise in nations
and nationalism. Reasons are sought and found in any number of historical developments;
such as the industrial revolution, advances in literacy, decolonisation, universal suffrage,
and so on. Political and historical models have mapped and traced the changes, offering
insights and explanations on the differences between nation and state, between race and
nation. In recent years, however, cultural theories have garnered the most attention, most
notably that of Benedict Anderson.
Anderson’s thesis of the nation as an ‘imagined community’ is well known and needs
little explanation here—though it will be useful to retrace some of the background to his
argument. Anderson maintains that the morphology of the modern nation has been
brought about by ‘three fundamental cultural conceptions’, which descended from
antiquity, but began to disintegrate from the time of the Renaissance onwards. The first
and most important of these was the development of print-capitalism, which helped lift
the veil of illiteracy and broke down the power mystique of script-languages. The second
was the evaporation of the divine right of kings and the accordant centripetal power of an
unaccountable monarch. The third was the metamorphosis in temporal understanding,
which encouraged the idea of linear time, of progress ‘driving a harsh wedge between
cosmology and history’. The first two of these are relatively unremarkable; they are well-
established phenomena and Anderson applies them practically and profitably to his
thesis. The third point on the changing apprehension of time is more adventurous, and
more problematic—I shall return to this below.
The extraordinary influence of Anderson’s formulation is no doubt due in part to its
felicitous verbal style. The phrase ‘imagined community’ has proven immensely seductive,
yet its ease of currency hides many of the more disturbing aspects it assumes. The first
problem is what appears to be an implied homogeneity. How can a body as necessarily
large and diverse as a nation—even the most monolingual, monocultural nation—be
imagined as a single community? Anderson offers a number of reasons why and how this
is so, beginning with language. Looking at the origins of national consciousness he traces
developments in printing, the role of colonial lingua francas, of creolisation, and especially
the ‘philological-lexicological revolution’ of the late nineteenth century. He considers the
waning of script-languages belonging to exclusive power elites, and the corresponding
rise of vernacular languages and indigenous literatures. He examines the status of French
and German in Alsace–Lorraine, the orthographical rupture between Croatian and
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Serbian, and the nationalising of the Tuscan dialect in unified Italy. The climax of
Anderson’s focus on language is his dictum that the nation is ‘conceived in language, not
in blood’.13
In Australia things were different. Colonisation nationalised the whole continent
making borders meaningless, and the tidal wave of English effectively erased Aboriginal
languages as a threat to the dominant Anglophile culture. There was rampant xenophobia,
however, and language policy was harnessed as a prophylactic against foreign
contamination. The first law passed by the new federal government in 1901 was the
codification of the White Australia Policy, which enshrined an immigration policy that
was overtly racist not just in practice but in name. The act functioned by the application
of a farcical principle, but it gave immigration officials a linguistic mechanism by which
they could reject anyone, and thus keep Australia white and British.
The use of language in such a political fashion is testament to its national importance.
But in reality it was blood, the martial underbelly to Anderson’s phrase, that quickened
Australian nationalism more. At a Federation banquet during the Premiers’ Conference in
Melbourne in 1890 Henry Parkes drew a colourful metaphor for the assembled guests to
see the links between Britain and the Australasian colonies: ‘A crimson thread of kinship
runs through us all’.14 The original crimson thread was a red strand twined into the ropes
of the Royal Navy, but it was the haematic dimension of the metaphor that caught the
imagination. Blood was something dear to everyone, and British blood was what kept
Australia united.
The importance of blood to the national imagining runs on two levels. There are the
blood lines of racial strength and purity; and there is the blood of sacrifice and
martyrdom. Lawson foresaw ‘blood on the wattle’, and its purifying effect. DH Lawrence
captured something similar in Kangaroo, where Somers remarks that, ‘somebody will have
to water Australia with their blood before it’s a real man’s country. The soil, the very plants
seem to be waiting for it.” ’15 This unsettling passage has generated much comment, and
invites criticism from a number of quarters; not least in relation to its blindness to armed
conflict between settlers and Aborigines. But whatever Lawrence wanted to say about
Australia, he was right to draw a link between blood, masculinity, vegetal health and the
nation. These, it should be noted, are precisely the same topoi of James Frazer’s thesis in
The Golden Bough, which influenced so many of Lawrence’s generation.
In further highlighting the role of language in imagining the nation, Anderson suggests
that national anthems and songs afford opportunities for community afflux: ‘Singing the
Marseillaise, Waltzing Matilda, and Indonesia Raya provide occasions for unisonality, for the
echoed physical realization of the imagined community’.16 The Anzac myth provides its
own example of unisonance in the intoning of the verses from Binyon’s ode For the Fallen.
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It happens each year at the Dawn Service; it happens everyday at 6 pm in the Leagues
Clubs, as gamblers and machines together fall silent in a moment of supreme bathos. Even
here, though, blood has insinuated its way into the linguistic unisonance, and the sanctity
of that spilt blood generally stifles dissent. Here, through the awesome motivating power
of war, the unified ‘imagined community’ becomes fully flesh.
——————————
Wars offer the greatest chance for a centripetal concentration of nationalistic imagining.
And in the typical myopia of nationalism, it is not what happens to the enemy that affects
the imagination, but what happens reflexively to the nation. It’s not about killing the
other, it’s about sacrificing the self. As Anderson observes: ‘the great wars of this century
are extraordinary not so much in the unprecedented scale on which they permitted
people to kill, as in the colossal numbers persuaded to lay down their lives’.17 The
reasoning, he suggests, is that ‘dying for one’s country assumes a moral grandeur’ above
any sacrifice to a mere organisation. But there is a strong whiff of Paul Fussell’s ‘high
diction’ in Anderson’s use of the sentimental phrase ‘laying down one’s life’. Equally
terrible is indeed the reverse, that nationalism or patriotism enabled so many men to
overthrow their normal moral code and kill, all in the name of their country. Gopal
Balakrishnan argues that the relationship of war to the pathos of national identity is only
fitfully addressed by Anderson, who is ‘no doubt discomfited by its implications’. He sees
Anderson’s suggestion that nations are conceived in language, not in blood, as a ‘hopeful
formulation’ that is too optimistic. Balakrishnan concludes: ‘Without the possibility of
sacrifice it is doubtful whether the nation evokes the affective peaks of collective
belonging that Anderson attributes to the national imagination’.18 Nationalism is thus
likened to a seed that requires incubation, and that heat is provided not in the temperance
of peace but in the crucible of war.
Looking at the legacy of military history that underpins the national ideologies of so
many nations, Michael Howard asks ‘Could a nation really be born without a war?’19 In
Australia Henry Parkes had hoped so. At his speech at Tenterfield in November 1889,
Parkes suggested it was time the six colonies in Australia come together to form one
nation.20 After all, he said, Australia now had as many inhabitants as did the USA when
they had become an independent nation, and what they had achieved, Australia could
too. Parkes spurred his audience to consider that ‘surely what the Americans had done by
war, the Australians could bring about by peace’. The eventual answer to Parkes’s rhetoric
would be both yes and no. Politically, Australia would become a nation in 1901, through a
peaceful and very democratic process. But imaginatively and spiritually, the nation waited
to be consummated by the great narrative of sacrifice.
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Discussing Mabo and Gallipoli as sites of national identity, Stephen Muecke 
concludes that ‘Death is at the heart of the formation of the nation … States can be 
set up as political entities, but they only become nations through the magical or spiritual
agency of death’.21 Muecke is writing in the critical discourse of cultural analysis, where
we might expect such connections and pronouncements. It is all the more arresting
however to see similar claims in the editorial of the Sydney Morning Herald of 
26 April 1922:
The Gallipoli campaign has been described as ‘the most glorious failure in military
history.’ But was it a failure to Australia? It made us a nation. Was the price worth paying?
Are not nations like individuals? If the nation is to be born, if the nation is to live,
someone must die for it.
Journalistic rhetoric may have been more exuberant then than it is today, but this is still a
dramatic statement. It is almost shocking to see it put so directly: if the nation is to live,
someone must die for it. This is a myth model in discursive action. The logic of the
argument is precisely what we find in Frazer’s theories of succession and regeneration,
where the King of the Wood gains his crown by killing the previous incumbent: life is
born out of death. The whole key to understanding why Gallipoli became such an instant
and powerful image of nationhood is recognising that all the pieces had already been put
in place—except the great narrative of sacrifice. Gallipoli provided the requisite epic
narrative to lend a mythic dimension to the story. It provided the folds needed to pleat
history into the story of nationhood. Obeyesekere stresses that ‘political and social
conditions may either foster a particular myth model, rendering it dominant, or help in
the invention of a new myth model based on older ones no longer apposite to the times’.22
The sort of nation Australia imagined itself to be, or to want to be, was thus very much
influenced by the ‘myth model’ of the nation-state that was prevalent and fashionable in
the modern period.
Repeating
The early decades of the twentieth century constitute a period ne plus ultra when political
and social conditions fostered the idea of the nation-state. Indeed, Hobsbawm calls the
period the ‘apogee of nationalism’. But what sort of nations were coming into being, and
what were the myths that accompanied this burgeoning narrative of nationhood?
Decolonisation had begun in the Americas a century before; the Ottoman Empire had
been disintegrating in Europe and Asia Minor for decades; the Boer War had tested the
frailty of European administration in Africa. Both the idea and the reality of nationalism
were well established before 1914. So while the Great War provided the political
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mechanism for destroying old states and creating new ones, it did not, of itself, provide
the motivation in the first place.
Indeed the Great War is increasingly being seen less as a discrete, unique phenomenon,
but as part of much larger cycles and movements. Hobsbawm himself describes the world
wars of the first half of the twentieth century as thirty or forty years of continuous
conflict.23 And just as the warfare of 1914–18 becomes part of a longer, larger narrative,
so too the nation-building that historically has been seen as a direct consequence of that
particular conflict can properly be placed on a larger scale of time and events. Such a
proposition then makes us ask whether the formation of nations circa 1918 is part of a
larger story than simply the Great War. It questions whether events alone, however
cataclysmic, can be the leaven for nationhood. It raises the possibility that if events are
sufficiently similar to pre-existing paradigms of nation-forming, this can suggest the myth
model of nationhood.
As is well known the whole notion of history as shaped by single events has been
challenged by the Annales school of history. Lucien Febvre characterises events as simply
the ‘visible crust of history’—that is, prominent, but superficial. Jacques le Goff likewise
attacks the ‘illusions’ and ‘facilities’ of event history (histoire événementielle). Reflecting on
his own experience of growing up in the memory of the Great War and living through the
subsequent warfare of the 1940s, le Goff argues that even on the world scale, wars do not
create a significant ‘break’ in the course of history. And then there is Fernand Braudel,
who sketches a theoretical apparatus for a new historical discourse that eschews the ‘feats
of princes’ as merely the waves on the surface, when the real subject should be the deep
currents of the powerful tides.24
As well as subverting the dominant role of events in history, Braudel questioned the
understanding of time. Advocating the principle of la longue durée, Braudel proposed a
distinction between individual time, social time and geographical time. It is only when we
get beyond the event history of individual time that we can begin to see things according
to la longue durée, to think in the social time of institutions or the geographical time of
ecology. Employing these different epistemologies of time enabled Braudel to link (or
suppress) disparate events and actors in the grand narrative of his subject, the
Mediterranean world in the latter sixteenth century.25 Taking up Braudel’s challenge, 
Tom Griffiths has written of the need to reconsider and ‘reconfigure’ Australian history 
in terms of la longue durée, or what he calls ‘deep time’. For Griffiths, the emergence 
of deep time gives an entirely new dimension to current debates in Australia, debates
about issues such as environment and population, and cultural identity and
colonisation.26
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In terms of nationhood, the lessons of la longue durée are compelling. Nations do not
come into being in the scale of the short term of individual time. Any given event,
however significant, is always part of a larger cycle or series: ‘Each “current event” brings
together movements of different origins, of a different rhythm’.27 Similarly then, nation-
ness can be said to be an idea and a reality that came to prominence in the late nineteenth
century, and had its apogee in the turmoil of thirty years of world war. But the conditions
that engendered nationalism begin well before this, and the paradigms stretch back to
antiquity. Moreover, at a metaphorical level, the rhetoric of nationalism and nationhood is
to be found in symbols and narratives that have no specific origins, but exist in many
forms and recur in many ages; that is to say, in myths.28
In this sense it is clear that while the Great War cannot be said to be the root cause 
of nationhood, it nevertheless provides the quintessential topoi in the narratives of
nationhood: death and sacrifice. The poet Wilfred Owen was only too well aware of this,
as his bitter appropriation of Horace demonstrates in ‘Dulce et decorom est’.29 Another
famous invocation of nationhood that Owen reworks is the story in Genesis of Abraham
and Isaac. He takes the original message of trust and promise and turns it into one of
betrayal and murder, so that Abraham slays his son, ‘and half the seed of Europe, 
one by one’.30 Apart from the savage inversion of the sacrificial covenant, the deeper 
irony is in the intertextual reference—for the purpose of the story is not just that 
the Lord spares Isaac’s life, but that the obedient Abraham is rewarded with a nation: 
his descendants (‘seed’) will be ‘as numerous as the stars in the sky and the grains of 
sand on the sea-shore’.31 This is surely one of the greatest poetic realisations of the 
idea of nation, the imagining of a fertile and enduring future. Not that Wilfred Owen 
saw it that way.
The sacrifice of the first-born son is a recurring motif in the Jewish and Christian
bibles: Abraham offers up Isaac; the Pharaoh orders all male Hebrew babies to be thrown
into the Nile; the first-born of Egypt are killed; King Herod schemes to capture the infant
Jesus; God sacrifices his only son on the cross. Repetition is one of the most important
tropes in these texts. The Torah frequently tells the same story twice in different
redactions, just as the four gospels give multiple accounts of the same scenes from the life
of Jesus. Narrative time thus constantly circles back upon itself. Similarly, while the lists of
the ancestors and their ages mark the passing of time, the unreality of their supernatural
life-spans injects considerable tension into the historical chronology. The theme of
prophecy that binds the two testaments is another element in this overall temporal
slippage, in which narrative time is stretched and folded, and historical time is
condensed. Consider the following observation of Auerbach’s:
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If an occurrence like the sacrifice of Isaac is interpreted as prefiguring the sacrifice of
Christ, so that in the former the latter is as it were announced and promised and the latter
‘fulfils’ the former, then a connexion is established between the two events which are
linked neither causally nor temporally.32
Auerbach describes this as an example of a ‘simultaneity’ of time. Elsewhere in the Exodus
story we see a condensation of narrative time, what Robert Alter calls an ‘illusion of
simultaneity’.33 It is comparable to the ‘messianic time’ that Walter Benjamin describes in
his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, which places the past and future together in an
instantaneous present. But Benjamin identifies another mode of temporality, which he
styles a ‘progression through homogenous, empty time’.34
It is this new ontology of reckoning time that Anderson sees in the development of
nationalism, a moment when simultaneity is marked ‘not by prefiguring and fulfilment,
but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar’.35 Such shifts in
ontology are then distilled into the two literary forms that ushered in the era of
nationalism: namely, the novel and newspaper, epitomised respectively by realism and by
calendrical measurement. Edward Said questions Anderson’s ‘mistakenly linear
periodizations’, but such a model remains appealing to many, historiographers and
literary historians alike.36 Anderson thus agrees with Auerbach that the biblical notion of
simultaneity is ‘wholly alien to our own’.
It is only alien to a positivist conception of time, however—time as a linear
progression, time as the march of civilisation. In la longue durée, in deep time, the
paradoxes of past and future are more easily reconcilable. Indeed, in mythic chronology,
time can go forward or backward, or be flattened altogether in simultaneity. Repetition, at
this level, thus becomes the key to reconfiguring our understanding of the events in
individual time. In a realist temporality, repetition can be fortuitous or irrelevant; it is
simply coincidence. But in a mythical temporality, repetition signifies inevitability, it
carries the authority of destiny.
Pleating
This collapsing of time is a key element in what might be called a ‘chronotope of
nationhood’. Bakhtin gives the name chronotope to the ‘intrinsic connectedness of
temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature’.37 In the
literary artistic chronotope, writes Bakhtin, spatial and temporal are fused into a single,
concrete whole: ‘Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, and becomes artistically visible;
likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and
history’.38 Because of the interrelation of ‘literature’ and historiography, we can extend the
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chronotope’s domain to historical poetics, where time and space are of the utmost
importance. And in regard to Australia’s nationhood, we can see that what we might call
the ‘Anzac chronotope’ comprises a chronology of simultaneity, and a locus of elsewhere.
The temporal dimension in this chronotope of nationhood involves a chronological
perspective that dismisses calendrical time, and collapses the past, present and future into
a simultaneous ‘now’, what Benjamin calls Jetztseit.39 It shows that the Gallipoli nation is
shot through with the same sort of mythic imagining that Auerbach saw in the biblical
conception of time: ‘The here and now is no longer merely a link in an earthly chain of
events, it is simultaneously something which has always been, and will be fulfilled in the
future’.40 Barthes sees myth having the same effect on history: ‘Myth deprives the object of
which it speaks of all History’.41 Barthes calls this the ‘miraculous evaporation of history’,
where the object’s origin can only be found in Eternity.
The spatial dimension (topos/locus) of the chronotope is ‘somewhere else’; it is distant,
in another place. This condition of spatial liminality echoes the rite of initiation (rites de
marge), where an initiand is taken away to another place, and only returned to their
family/society once the requisite rites have been performed. Liminality has an important
function in narrative as well, where it is typical in romance genres for transformative
action to take place in some separate place at some remove from the everyday (a forest, a
desert, underground or overseas, for instance). In addition to its abstract value of
otherness, the place of nationhood for Australia has a specific valency in its proximity to
the ‘cradle of civilisation’ and sites of classical myth such as Greece and Troy. Equally
important is that the action is played out on a European stage in front of an Old World
audience, who witness the initiation of the debutante nation.
We see here the pleating of history in all its metaphorical implications. When a skirt is
folded into pleats a number of things are achieved. First, parts that are originally separate
come together; this is the collapsing of temporal distance, as past and future meet together
in the present. Second, parts that were once visible are placed out of sight, hidden within
the folds of the pleats; here is the displacing or forgetting of unwanted history. Third, the
pleats create an impression of structure and order, as the creases and folds that are the
ruptures of history are ironed into a smooth surface. Here is how the ‘pile of wreckage’
witnessed by Benjamin’s angel of history is transformed into a narrative of destiny and
fulfilment—the wreckage is simply swept under the carpet, or in this metaphor, hidden in
the pleats.
It will be apparent that the temporality of the chronotope being proposed here is not
the linear time which Anderson maintains is the midwife to modern nationalism, which
historicises the nation and locates it firmly in time and space. Where Anderson sees
nationhood as rooted in a thoroughly modern temporality, this other model disrupts
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linearity and rejects historicism. Logically then, the narrative of Australia’s nationhood is
contrary to that of the nations that figure in Anderson’s thesis—in other words, Australia
is a different kind of nation.
Every nation is unique of course, but for the purposes of these theoretical arguments
Australia appears to stand apart. For example, at the time of Federation, Australia had
fought no foreign wars and knew only one language; it was ethnically confident in its
Britishness. As an island continent, there have never been common borders to dispute.
More importantly, the whole nation only came into existence after the shifts in cultural
conception that drive Anderson’s thesis. Its polity was fabricated without a feudal
hangover, its constitution was blended from the two most sophisticated democracies in
the world.
In these terms Australia was and is an always-already modern nation. Unlike so many
of the would-be nations described by Anderson and other theorists, white Australia had
little historical matter of its own out of which to imagine a new future. Australia’s history
could be measured in decades, not in centuries. Its heritage was tallied not in dynasties,
but across a mere brace of generations. Les Murray tersely captures this anxiety in his
poem ‘A Brief History’: ‘We are the Australians. Our history is short.’42 For Murray, a
reactionary republican, ‘A short history gets you imperial scorn’. This nation craved an
ancestral past, not a modern future. What Australia lacked was some cultural and
historical baggage to call its own. It was not embarrassed by a medieval history, but in
desperate need of one. There is no need to escape from a synchronous relation with the
past; rather, this is exactly the type of temporal imagining the nation was searching for, a
way of claiming an ancestral heritage without having to inflate the meagre and dubious
details of the country’s ‘short history’.
The myth model embedded in the narrative of the Gallipoli nation is not that of
modern Poland or Serbia, or other nations with long histories of heroic struggle against
the suppression of their identity. Nor is it the model of Argentina or Mexico, of wresting
independence in a war against a colonial overlord. The federation of the colonies was
different too from the unification of Italy or Germany in the nineteenth century, for there
was not the same sense of deep cultural destiny. In fact, the Australian scenario was in
some ways closer to the fascist models that emerged as a consequence of the Great War:
one that attempted to resurrect national pride by invoking a simultaneity of time and
reaching back to the imperial glory of Rome; another that did the same by imagining the
present as a constant for one thousand years of German Reich into the future. As Cassirer
says, ‘In myths, the nation’s past is dramatized in such a way as to make its future destiny
apparent’.43 The Gallipoli nation is a people trying to invent for themselves that very past,
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stretching back into almost-forgotten history, and through a similar collapsing of time, to
imagine the same infinite future.
Here is the real key to Gallipoli. More than anything else the Anzac myth constructs a
means of repressing the secrets of Australia’s genesis. By wrenching the origin of the
nation into the twentieth century, the invasion and colonisation are hidden from view. The
Aboriginal population is conveniently forgotten. The convict stain is wiped clean. In this
narrative there is no past, no chrysalis hiding unpalatable truths of a history that never
was. The Australian nation is an imago bursting forth as if from nowhere, ready to fly
upon the world stage. Such a construction adumbrates Barthes’s dictum that ‘what the
world supplies to myth is a historical reality … and what myth gives in return is a natural
image of this reality’.44
But every theory of nationalism and nationhood argues the contrary—that nations are
the end product of an already-established nationalism. Where then is the origin of the
‘Australian nation’? Is it to be found in Edmund Barton’s Federation slogan, ‘A nation for a
continent, and a continent for a nation’. Did it begin with Parkes’s speech at Tenterfield?
In the shearing sheds, or at Eureka? Was independence already nascent in the bruised
pride of transported convicts? It is impossible to single out any individual or event or
movement, for nations have no clearly identifiable conceptions or births. But wherever
the origins are sought, the nationalism that created the Commonwealth existed well
before Federation, and the nation that people suddenly see clearly in 1915 is new only in
their sight.
——————————
The key to the Frazerian cycle is the dialectic between originality and repetition. Each
year is new, but each season the same as the previous year. Each new king of the wood is
another individual, but they all suffer the same fate. This oxymoron can be seen in
Australia’s pathology of identity: only by being different can one be noticed, but only by
being the same can one be included. Although the Gallipoli nation purports to celebrate a
distinctive character and identity, it betrays the paradox that nationhood has been
achieved as per the old way, war and sacrifice—the nation is not so different after all.
What other models might Australia have aspired to? Manning Clark held fast to a
romanticised view of Australia as a truly new society, where democratic liberties would
triumph over privilege and capital. But with the coming of the Great War, and Australia’s
desperate eagerness to participate, he concluded that the ideals of Australia had been ‘cast
to the winds’.45 The nation was just like any other, and would cleave to the old dead tree,
never the young tree green.
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